Suharto has shown himself to be remarkably resilient. His rule is certainly not unopposed but he has continually sought to reaffirm his authority and has successfully met any challenges. Being president of Indonesia is like riding a tiger - the succession problem looms closer and closer with each passing year and, unless Suharto dies in the saddle, his real problem is to make sure he doesn't get eaten if he decides to step down.

The big issue dominating Indonesian politics in the early 1990s has been the succession of Suharto. In 1988, he was 'elected' to his 5th five-year term. While he has made no public declaration of his intentions to stand for reelection again in 1993 (when he will be 72 years old), there is little doubt that he is already manoeuvering to secure a sixth term (and now a 7th - mlm).

Opposition is building. Even prominent members of the military have suggested that he ought to retire when his current term ends, provoking strong verbal threats from Suharto. The press - which has become increastingly daring in 1991, with the military's suport, has become more critical of Suharto.

An interesting trend is that Suharto has started to sound more and more 'Islamic' in his public pronouncements - interesting because he has devoted much of his career to extoling secularism while suppressing Islamic fundamentalists, who he considers the greatest threat to Indonesia's political stability. Because there is growing opposition from the military to Suharto seeking yet another presidential term in 1993, some speculate that he is ready to play the 'Muslim card' to hang on to power. In 1990, a petition by 21 prominent Muslim leaders was circulated, endorsing Suharto for another presidental term. In 1991, Suharto made his first ever pilgrimage to Mecca. Golkar Party MPs who have dared to criticise Suharto have found themselves dropped from the list of candidates who can run for reelection (they need the party's permission) and replaced with candidates with impeccable Muslim credentials. Suharto's new strategy is clearly a gamble - he is alienating the army, the final 'trump card' in Indonesian politics.

The Army
For most of his career, Suharto and the army have been as close as lips and teeth. It was the military that swept Suharto into power, and it is largely the military that has kept him there. Suharto's presently deteriorating relations with the military could be his undoing.
the present cabinet contains only a minority of military men but they hold some important ministerial positions. The Defence Minister, General Benny Murdany, for example, is probably the second most powerful man in Indonesia today. Despite it's minority in the cabinet, and the fact that Suharto prefers a civilian image in public, the army is where the political power in Indonesia rests. Both the political and the military philosophy of the Indonesian army positively encourages involvement in politics, and the army hardly regards itself as having usurped power that somehow 'rightfully' belongs to civilians. It was General Nasution who was largely responsible for developing the idea of the army having a social and political as well as a military role.
This idea was taken and developed at the Army Staff and Command School in the late '50s and early 60s (when the then Colonel Suharto was a student there). It was decided that national defence policy was to be based on the army, since the navy and air force would never be strong enough to block an invasion. The army would have to be one that could continue, in the last resort, an indefinite guerrilla struggle. To be successful in such a war the army would have to be accepted and supported by the people.
Therefore, to prepare for this eventuality, the army would have to be permanently in contact with the people at a local level so as to build up and sustain their goodwill. Thus developed the idea and the subsequent implementation of 'Territorial Management', the establishment of a parallel administration down to village level where the resident army personnel could supervise and prod the civil authorities. There is the assumption within the Indonesian army that it should play a central role in uniting the nation and guiding its development.

The President
Suharto was born in 1921 and spent his childhood amongst the peasants in small villages in Central Java and in Solo, his father ensuring that he got a primary and middle school education. The time he spent from the age of 15 living in the house of a dukun (faith healer) appears to have imbued him with a sense of traditional Javanese mysticism which has lasted to this day. He joined the Royal Dutch Indies Army in 1940 and quickly became a seargant. He served with the Japanese during the occupation and became an officer in the Japanese-sponsered Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Motherland. He led attacks against the Dutch during the independence struggle after WWII and rose rapidly through the ranks.
In 1962 he was promoted to Major-General by Sukarno and was put in charge of the forces which were set up to take West Irian from the Dutch. In 1961 he became commander of the army's Strategic Reserve (later to be known as Kostrad). This was an important posting because the reserve, set up by Nasution, was a well-equipped, highly mobile fighting force directly at the disposal of the General Staff, thus avoiding any argument or even outright opposition from regional commanders.
Just why Suharto took the role of overthrowing Sukarno is unclear - perhaps it was personal ambition, a reaction to the attempted coup, unease at the growing strength of the PKI, a reaction to the deterioration of the economy under Sukarno, or a mixture of all four. Certainly Suharto cut through his opponents with exceptional determination.
One thing is certain - Suharto, and his relatives, have become very rich since he came to power. For example, in 1991, the president's son, Tommy Suharto, was granted the lucrative clove monopoly. In Suharto's 1989 autobiography, the president stated that his family's financial dealings were simply 'social work'.

Corruption
There is one seemingly static, permanent feature of the Indonesian economy - corruption. High-placed government officials, and their families, routinely become quite wealthy durin their terms in office.
It would certainly be an understatement to say that the army and the economy of Indonesia are closely knit; military leaders head or ar mixed up with an incredible range of business enterprises. The reason for this can partly be found in the 50's when conventional sources of revenue for the army were so inadequate that other sources had to be found for army leaders to keep their units going. The army was not the only pooly paid institution; civil servants and professional people were taking second jobs and running private business to supplement inadequate offical pay packets.
In 1957 Dutch assets in Indonesia were seized as part of the government's anti-Dutch nationalisation policy of the time. The seizures were carried out by the army and it left the officers in charge of running factories, trading companies, and plantations. Some profits were directed back to their units and in areas with export produce, smuggling flourished. The problem with this sort of system is where philanthropy ends and corruption begins, where bonds of mutual loyalty mean that associates get promoted at the expense of competence, and where the army starts using it's muscle - such as martial law powers - to help it's profitable business enterprises keep making a profit.
Official kleptomania is not new under Suharto - it was normal under the Dutch rule, the rule of the VOC and during the rule of the Indonesian princes who farmed out monopolies and revenue-collecting agencies to favoured court clients. During the first years of independence once needed friends in key bureaucratic positions, and on a small scale this meant cash payments to petty officials. For big business it required an alliance with a minister or senior bureaucreat. When the regime changed in 1965-67 many business fiefdoms also changed - the Mercedes Benz dealership, for example, passed from a PNI linked businessman to an army trading company, and when that collapsed it went into the hands of General Ibnu Sutowo, who ran the Pertamina Oil Conglomerate.
While corruption is not a new problem in Indonesia, it has certainly been worsened by the political changes since 1965. These changes are the extension of the parallel military administration and the removal of any counterbalancing political forces. These forces are needed to keep in check the often united front of military and civilian administrators, security officials, and other local notables.

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